Early Origins

The Tuploev Bear is a large, four engine strategic bomber and missile platform and it has now seen over sixty years of service as a vital part of the country’s air force. The Bear completed its first flight in 1954 and entered service in 1956.

Its design was carried out by Andrei Tupolev himself and the plane was seen as a natural evolution from its predecessor, 1949’s TU 85. As such, the correct name for the aircraft is the Tupolev 95 – ‘Bear’ being its NATO reporting name.

Design Specifics

The Tupolev Bear was unique when it was built as it was the only active aircraft to use turbo prop engines. The other main distinctive feature is its swept back wings which make the Bear easily identifiable.

The wings bend back to an angle of 35 degrees and they were based on another early Tupolev aircraft, the TU-16.

Another feature that sets this aircraft apart from others is the noise. The speed and altitude that the Tu95 flies at means that the propellers rotate at faster than the speed of sound and this makes it the nosiest military plane in the world. A stealth bomber this is not!

Active Service

When the Bear first flew back in the mid 1950’s the Cold War was at its height and its early roles included vital maritime surveillance of US naval vessels.

The Bear was easily identifiable to the US military, whose instructions were to intercept it whenever it approached within a 200 mile radius of aircraft carriers and escort it away from NATO airspace.

Over the years, the TU-95 became something of a Cold War icon and it engaged in regular demonstration flights starting from the Kola Peninsular and taking in the Western US coastline and a sightseeing trip to Cuba along the way.

Nuclear Capability

Perhaps the Bear’s greatest achievement during its early years was also its most worrying. In 1961 it carried the heaviest and most powerful nuclear weapon ever detonated.

The AN602, Tsar Bomba was only ever built once and it was the job of the TU-95  to carry it to its final destination, the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago where it was successfully detonated.

The Tupolev Bear today

The Cold War may be over and the Soviet Union a thing of the past but the Bear has still been engaging in some antagonistic activity in recent times.

In July 2011, two TU-95’s flew over the northeast Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan during an 11 hour flight and had to be escorted by Japanese fighters for part of the way.

And, back in 2007 there was a brief flurry of interest from the British media as it emerged that the British airforce was regularly having to scramble its jets to intercept what were dubbed as Russian spy planes.

The Tupolev Bear is a great feat of Russian engineering but it seems that the country’s military just can’t help but show it off. And, given that it’s scheduled to stay in service until at least 2040, it’s likely that we’ll see it popping up in excitable Western news reports for quite some time to come.

Tupolev Bear – Linchpin of Russia’s Air Force is a post from: Siberian Light

The Russian Air Force is very keen to tell the world it’s back. This weekend alone, Russian Tu-95 Bear bombers first violated Japanese airspace and then, in their most audacious flight for a fair few years, went on to ‘buzz’ the US Aircraft Carrier USS Nimitz.

Violation of Japanese Airspace
On Saturday, a Russian Tu-95 bomber overflew the Pacific island of Sofugan, 650km (400 miles) south of Tokyo for three minutes. The Japanese air force took the incursion so seriously that they scrambled 22 fighter jets to escort the Russian bomber out of Japanese airspace.

The furious Japanese government have demanded an explanation from Moscow, but a Russian Air Force spokesman was adamant that they have done nothing wrong:

All flights of the Russian Air Force were carried out in accordance with international air space regulations without breaching the other states’ borders.

Many in Japan are suspicious that the overflight was linked to an annual rally to demand the return of the Kurile Islands to Japan – they were seized by Soviet troops at the end of the Second World War and never returned. Despite recent concilliatory moves, both Japan and Russia still dispute the status of the islands, and have as a result, never signed a formal treaty ending their Second World War conflict.

Buzzing the USS Nimitz Aircraft Carrier

The story which has really hit the headlines, though, was the Tu-95 that buzzed the USS Nimitz – flying directly over the nuclear powered aircraft carrier at a height of just 600 metres not just once, but twice.

Four US F/A 18 fighter jets were scrambled and escorted the Russian Bear until it was comfortably out of range, but US officials are playing down the incident.

Naval Admiral Gary Roughead told reporters:

“It was a very benign flight that came through, and we just latched on to them and followed them in. I know I’m not playing this up very much, but that’s the way I see it. They came out to look. We joined up (and) flew with them until they went home.”

The Russian bomber was one of a squadron of four that approached the US carrier, but the only one to actually fly directly overhead. Because it was in international waters, though, the US could not legally prevent the Russian plane from flying overhead.

A new, more assertive Russia?

Reports of provocative Russian military activity are becoming increasingly frequent, right across the globe. Russia’s military is better funded than it has been for more than a decade, and the Kremlin feels that it is time to demonstrate that Russia is not quite the military basket case it once was.

But, all the same, there isn’t much to worry about here. Flights like these make good copy for the papers, but otherwise they don’t really surprise anyone in the world’s militaries.

The last Russian overflight of a US carrier was only four years ago, and the last Russian incursion into Japanese airspace was just two years ago. Incidents like these really are relatively common.

And I’m certain that, if the Russian’s sole remaining aircraft carrier ventured out of port more often, US planes would make their own overflights from time to time…

I think Russian paper Kommersant have probably got it about right when they point out that the Japanese and American militaries should actually be thanking the Russians:

A total of 22 fighters of various type, two early-warning planes and E-3A guidance AWACS were involved, so the Japanese could thank their Russian colleagues for the drill.

They should also be thanking the Russians for giving them yet another up close view of the Russian bomber’s flight capabilities – I’m sure both the Japanese and Americans will have collected bucketloads of valuable data, which someone, somewhere will be merrily analysing.

Russian bombers 'buzz' US aircraft carrier is a post from: Siberian Light

Under the then unknown Georgy Zhukov, the Soviets won a crushing victory at the batte of Khalkhin-Gol (known in Japan as the Nomonhan Incident). Defeat persuaded the Japanese to expand into the Pacific, where they saw the United States as a weaker opponent than the Soviet Union. If the Japanese had not lost at Khalkhin Gol, they may never have attacked Pearl Harbor.

The Japanese decision to expand southwards also meant that the Soviet Eastern flank was secured for the duration of the war. Instead of having to fight on two fronts, the Soviets could mass their troops – under the newly promoted General Zhukov – against the threat of Nazi Germany in the West.

In terms of its strategic impact, the battle of Khalkhin Gol was one of the most decisive battles of the Second World War, but no-one has ever heard of it. Why?

Rising Tensions
It was perhaps not all that surprising that the Soviet Union and Japan, two expansionist powers who just happened to be close neighbours, butted heads in the Mongolian borderlands.

Tensions between the two had been high for decades, and had erupted into open conflict on a number of occasions. Japan had clearly had an edge over Russia during the early part of the 20th century – it had decisively defeated Tsarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 (a conflict most memorable, perhaps, for the Russian Navy’s folly of sailing its entire Baltic fleet around the globe only to be promptly sunk by the Japanese Navy within days of its arrival), and had occupied Vladivostock for several years during the Russian civil war.

But, by the 1930s, the Soviet Union under Stalin was a resurgent power, and had become a major regional rival to the Japanese. The Japanese High Command were particularly concerned about the threat Soviet submarines posed to Japanese shipping, and the ease with which Soviet bombers, operating out of Vladivostok, would be able to reach Tokyo.

Flashpoint

By the late 1930s, both Mongolia and bordering Manchuria (Manchukuo) were Soviet and Japanese puppet states.

The border between the two was hotly disputed. Japanese backed Manchuria claimed that the border ran along the Khalkhin-Gol river, whereas the Mongolians argued that the border actually ran just east of Nomonhan village, some 10 miles east of the river.

Although the two countries had previously fought some minor skirmishes (most notably at Changkufeng/Lake Khasan in 1938, a battle which resulted in more than 2,500 casualties on both sides), the battle of Khalkin Gol was sparked when, on 11 May 1938, a small Mongolian cavalry united entered the disputed area in search of grazing for their horses. They were quickly given a bloody nose and expelled by a larger Manchurian unit but, within days, the Mongolians returned with greater support and forced the Manchurian forces to retreat.

The conflict slowly but gradually escalated until Soviet and Japanese forces were drawn into direct conflict. On 28 May Soviet forces surrounded and destroyed a Japanese reconnaisance unit. The Japanese unit, led by Lt Colonel Yaozo Azuma suffered 63% casualties in total, losing 8 officers and 97 men, plus suffering 34 wounded.

A month of relative quiet followed this battle. But, instead of using the time to consider a peace deal, both sides redoubled their efforts to build up their forces in the region.

Daring Japanese Air Raid

The quiet was shattered on 27 June by a daring Japanese air-raid on the Soviet air base at Tamsak-Bulak in Mongolia. The unprepared Soviets lost many planes on the ground although, once they got airborne they gave a good account of themselves. Their skill, however, could not prevent the Japanese pilots returning gloriously home, having destroyed twice as many Soviet planes as they had lost themselves.

However, their glory was short-lived. The Imperial Japanese Army Headquarters, based in Tokyo, had not been told of the attack in advance, and was not amused at the local commander’s initiative. When news of the raid reached Tokyo, furious Generals immediately ordered that no further air strikes would be launched – a decision for which Japanese foot-soldiers later paid a high price.

The Japanese ground attack

Despite their decision to withdraw air cover, Tokyo was happy to authorise a land-based operation to “expell the invaders.”

Lt. Gen. Michitaro Komatsubara, well schooled officer, planned a devastating two-pronged assault that would encircle and destroy the Soviet armies and bring him a glorious victory.

His Northern task force launched its first assalt on 1st July. After easily crossing the Khalkhin Gol river, Japanse soldiers drove the Soviet forces from Baintsagan Hill and quickly began to advance southwards. The following day his Southern task force followed them with another massive assault.

However, Komatsubara soldiers were ill-prepared, and not able to take advantage of their early success. Poor logistical planning meant that their supply line across the river consisted of just one pontoon bridge.

Seizing their opportunity, the Soviets under Zhukov quickly rallied 450 tanks for a daring counter-attack. Despite being entirely without infrantry support, they attacked the Japanese task force on three sides, and very nearly encircled them.

By 5 July, the battered Japanese Northern Taskforce had been forced back across the river.

The second Japanese attack

Following the failure of their first attack, the Japanese withdrew and planned their next move. Defeat was not an option for Komatsubara. After giving his soldiers a fortnight to recover, and restock their supplies, he conceived another assault plan – this one relying on brute force.

On 23 July, backed by a massive artillery bombardment, the Japanese threw two divisions of troops at the Soviet forces that had, by now, crossed the river and were defending the Kawatama bridge. wo days of fierce fighting resulted in some minor Japanse advances, but they were unable to break Soviet lines and reach the bridge. Despite thousands of casualties, the battle was effectively a stalemate.

Unable to progress further, and rapidly running out of artillery supplies, the Japanese decided that discretion was the better part of valour, and disengaged to plan a third assault.

The Soviet Counter-attack

Planning for a third Japanse assault went well, but the Soviets under Zhukov beat Lt Gen Komatsubara to the punch.

By August 20th, Zhukov had amassed a force of more than 50,000 men, 498 tanks and 250 planes. Matched against him was a similarly sized, but not well armoured Japanese force, that had no idea the Soviet counter-attack was coming.

A classic combined arms assault followed, as thousands of Soviet infantry attacked the Japanese centre, Soviet armour encircled the Japanese flanks, and the Soviet air-force and artillery pounded the Japanese from long-range.

By August 31st, the encircled Japanese force had been decimated and surrounded. A few Japanese units managed to break out of the encirclement, but those who remained followed Japanse martial tradition and refused to surrender.

Zhukov wiped them out with air and artillery attacks.

The conflict ends

Just one day later, half way across the world Hitler and Stalin invaded and carved up Poland.

Despite technically being an ally of Nazi Germany, it became prudent for Stalin to ensure that he Eastern flank was also secure. Rather than advancing to push home their tactical advantage and escalate the conflict, Zhukov’s armies were ordered not to press home their advantage. Instead, they were ordered to dig in and hold their position at Khalkhin Gol – the border they had previously claimed as theirs.

The total number of casualties suffered by each side is far from clear, particularly as neither Imperial Japan nor the Soviet Union were particularly ‘open’ societies.

Official statistics report just over 17,000 Japanese total casualties, compared with around 9,000 on the Soviet side. Some historians claim that Japan lost more than 45,000 men, while the victorious Soviet armies lost a ‘mere’ 17,000 men.

Most likely, as always, the true figure lies somewhere in the middle.

How Khalkhin-Gol changed the course of history

The battle of Khalkhin-Gol decisively showed the expansionist Japanese military that it was not a match for the Soviets – particularly while Japanese forces were still bogged down throughout China. The Soviets under combined their forces to stunning effect, while Japanese tactics remained stuck in a pre-modern mindset that valued honour and personal bravery more highly on the battlefield than massed forces and armour.

When Hitler finally invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 the Japanese, although tempted to join the attack, remembered the lessons of Khalkhin Gol and decided to remain on the sidelines, ensuring that the stretched Soviet military could focus its forces on just one front. This, in turn, meant that Nazi Germany was forced to fight a four year war on two fronts – against the Soviets in the East, and the British and Americans in the West.

Defeat at Khalkhin-Gol can also be seen as a major factor in the Japanese decision to expand into the Pacific. As expansion to the North-West was no longer an option, ill defended and scattered colonial territories made far easier targets. Even the United States was deemed a less formidable adversary than the Soviet Union and, if the Japanse had not lost at Khalkhin-Gol, they would surely have never attacked Pearl Harbour.

However, although the Japanese probably took the sensible strategic course after Khalkhin Gol of targetting a ‘weaker’ opponent, they didn’t learn the combat lessons dealt out by the Soviet army. Honour and bravery remained central to the Japanese military mentality and, once they had recovered from the initial onslaught, the United States and Britain were able to mass their forces and push the Japanese out of the Pacific and back to the Home Islands in one brutal battle after another.

Update: Thanks to Xavi, this post has now been translated into Spanish: La desconocida batalla que marcó la II Guerra Mundial

Update 2: Russia Today have released a video report of the 70th anniversary of the battle of Khalkhin Gol.

And what did they call it? Why, ‘the forgotten battle that shaped WW2′. Wonder where they got the inspiration for that headline from?

Khalkhin-Gol: The forgotten battle that shaped WW2 is a post from: Siberian Light

Details of the rescue itself are still a little sketchy but, according to this RIA Novosti report, it looks as though a British Scorpio mini-submarine cut the Russian sub free, allowing the crew to surface without any further assistance.  There is still some debate as to whether the Priz was entangled in fishing nets, antennae from a Russian underwater monitoring / early warning system, or both.  The same RIA Novosti report I’ve just quoted hedges its bets, referring to both nets and cable:

The British robot craft Scorpio involved in the international rescue
effort worked on the seabed for six hours, trying to cut the submarine
free of the fishing nets and underwater antennas in which she was
caught up, Ivanov said, adding that the Scorpio had been flown to
Kamchatka and taken out to sea on a Russian vessel.

A BBC report, though, quotes the owner of the British Scorpio submarine claiming that there were definitely no cables:

"There were a lot of fishing nets which we had to cut
away, but there were no steel cables, although some of it did look like
steel. Initial reports could have suggested there were steel rather
than nylon nets," Roger Chapman told the BBC.

(The BBC, by the way, also has a number of pictures of the submarine and its returned crew)

Putin has instructed Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov  (pictured here either looking heroically out to sea, or deeply regretting eating such a substantial breakfast that morning) to conduct a review of the indicident.  Not a particularly surprising move in any country, but especially not surprising in Russia where Putin is regularly seen on tv either issuing orders or dressing down his ministers. 

There certainly are plenty of serious questions to be asked about this incident, especially when one considers that this could so easily have been the third Russian submarine to sink in the last five years.  Previous submarine sinkings were the Kursk in 2000 with the loss of all 118 crew, and a decommissioned K159 nuclear sub in 2003, in which 9 of the 10 crewmembers lost their lives.  (As an aside – all of these incidents took place in August – a month now regarded by many in Russia as cursed due to the high incidence of disasters in this late summer month).

The BBC’s Sarah Rainsford points out a couple of the hard questions that will now be asked in Russia:

• why Russia still has no modern deep-sea rescue
  equipment, five years after the sinking of the Kursk nuclear submarine
  in which 118 sailors perished.
• why information on this accident from the navy was again late in coming and then deeply contradictory.

Once the initial shock and euphoria over the rescue wears off, I’d imagine that the first of these two questions will be uppermost in the minds of many.  Russia’s navy – once one of the world’s best – is clearly struggling to keep its ships and submarines afloat, making a deep sea rescue ability even more important than ever.  The irony that the very submariners who were trapped were a rescue crew themselves (although clearly not deep sea rescue crew) will also not be lost on the Russian press and public.

Having to call in for help, while praised by many in the West as a positive reaction that demonstrated that Russia’s Navy top brass had learnt at least some lessons from the Kursk disaster has clearly not gone down all that well at home.  One retired Russian Admiral blasted the decision to bring in foreign help as tantamount to giving away Russia’s military secrets (conveniently forgetting, most probably, that the US, British, French, Japanese and Chinese navies, if they are worth their salts, probably all know quite a lot about Russia’s naval surveillance techniques already).  The Russian Navy, while quick to thank and praise the British and Americans for their assistance, have not been tardy in pointing out that the rescue crews will be going straight home, either.

The varying information released by the Russian Navy, particulary estimates about how much oxygen was left in the submarine are important, and will certainly be looked at carefully.  The Russian government – particularly the Russian military – have a terrible record when it comes to releasing information, and are rarely given the benefit of the doubt these days.   However, it’s worth noting that incidents such as these are always confusing, and I doubt if any government or military press office in the world would be able to produce 100% accurate information.   Also, an additional factor may have been at play in this case,  as submariner Lubbers Line points out:

This submersible was primarily submarine rescue vehicle and therefore
the crew would have been trained in all aspects of submarine rescue
problems, including air quality and conservation.
Once the crew knew that they needed to await outside rescue that
training would have kicked in and may have been what pushed the air
supply to the more optimistic estimates.

Finally, it’s been interesting to note, also, that the Russian Navy is not the only one being criticised today.  The US Navy in particular has come in for some stick at submarine blog Ultraquiet No More for taking so long to get to the Far East.

The British reached the scene first in part because they had a
shorter flight to get their Scorpio to Russia. But it also took the
Americans four hours longer than expected Friday to load the Scorpios
onto a cargo plane in San Diego, with both the Air Force and the Navy citing each other for contributing to the delay.

Thankfully – and here, as a Brit, I shall indulge myself in a small piece of gloating – they weren’t needed.

Russian submariners rescued is a post from: Siberian Light

Typically with any Russian military mishap, information is confused and contradictory – one Admiral told Interfax that the submarine’s arial had tangled with an anchor, and that in order to free the submarine, the anchor must be blown up.  And nobody seems to have any clear idea as to how much oxygen remains in the sub – estimates have ranged from less than a day’s supply – in which case the air supply would have run out by now – to up to five days supply.  One thing we are reasonably sure of is that the crew are still alive – they have been in communication with the rescue teams.  However, once this rescue is complete, alongside criticism of the military’s technical preparedness expect further criticism of the way they have handled the flow of information to the press.

Britain, Japan and the United States have all sent assistance – primarily in the form of airlifting mini-subs of their own to assist with freeing the Russian sub.  I understand they have arrived, although it isn’t clear from reports whether they are actually involved in the rescue attempt at this stage.  Check out the US and British press for more news of their contributions.

Several blogs are providing updating coverage – notably Gateway Pundit and submarine bloggers Ultraquiet no more and Bubblehead (regular updates – just keep scrolling down the page).

I’ll update this post once any further information is available.

Update – 5:16 GMT:  Ultraquiet No More is cautiously optimistic that, if anyone can survive a submarine accident, these guys can:

So, things are looking hopeful. Frankly, this crew has the highest
probability of survival – they are a rescue team themselves. The
Russians were timely in asking for help, and the British, Japanese, and
Americans were quick to respond. I remain hopeful, and we should have
some information soon.

Update – 6:38 GMT: Just going to show that some Russian military officers are still stuck comfortably in their cold war timewarp, Interfax reports that one Admiral is furious at Russia’s decision to invite in foreign help, claiming it gives away military secrets:

He  expressed  surprise  that  the  Pacific  Fleet command had said
openly that  the  sub had got caught on an underwater antenna instead of
"an underwater  object."  "This antenna is one of the main components of
an active system for the long-range detection of submarines," he said.

Wheras, actually, one of the most promising aspects of this whole affair has been the navy’s decision to invite in foreign help – even if they don’t actually need to use it at the end – in complete contrast to almost every previous incident – particulary the sinking of the Kursk in 2000.  Even the general information coming out to the press – though horribly confusing and mismanaged – shows a general recognition that saving these sailors’ lives is far more important than trying to keep secret information that the US Navy probably has already.

Update – 7:00 GMT: Forgot to mention this earlier but, as it is becoming clear that the submarine is snagged on an antenna from a coastal monitoring system (see Ultraquiet No More for further info), I guess it’s fairly safe to assume that the crew were on some kind of mission related to that – maintenance perhaps?

Update – 7:15 GMT: I’ve just found this post by Lyndon at Scraps of Moscow.  He’s unearthed a Russian language report (from RIA Novosti), which claims that the mini-submarine was due to undergo a modernization refit in March 2006.  Lyndon speculates that this is someone’s advance attempt to deflect blame.

Update – 11:45 GMT: As I head off to bed there is still no news of the fate of the crew of the submarine.  It’s very late in Moscow now, and news agencies there seem to have shut down for the night; there’s no news from any of the other international wire services either.  It is well into the morning in the Far East, though, so expect to hear some more news in the next few hours.  I’ll update this post tomorrow morning, UK time.  In the meantime, check out Gateway Pundit, Ultraquiet no more and Bubblehead for the latest updates.

Finally for tonght, BBC News has a roundup of the Russian press reaction.  They aren’t happy with the way the authorities have been handling the crisis, that’s for sure.

Update – 10:30AM GMT, 7 August:

They’re up and safe!

The BBC reports:

Seven Russians trapped deep in the Pacific for three
days have been rescued after their mini-submarine was cut free of nets
it was snagged in.

They were able to climb out of the vessel unaided when
it resurfaced. Fears for their safety had mounted because of dwindling
oxygen supplies.

The BBC report goes on to detail the British mini-sub’s involvement in the rescue which, interestingly, seems to be at odds with earlier claims that the Russian sub was snagged on an underwater early monitoring system:

The managing director of the British firm involved in
the rescue – James Fisher Rumic – told the BBC the operation had taken
several hours.

"There were a lot of fishing nets which we had to cut
away, but there were no steel cables, although some of it did look like
steel. Initial reports could have suggested there were steel rather
than nylon nets," Roger Chapman told the BBC.

"But it was a fairly long operation, with quite a lot of
cutting, but eventually when most of it was freed, the submarine blew a
ballast tank and came free and shot to the surface."

I’ll post more analysis in a follow up post later today.

Update – 10:37am GMT: One last quick update to mention, once again, that the coverage at submarine blog Ultraquiet No More is both excellent and comprehenisive.  Go to the top of the page and scroll down – you’ll learn more than you would from any news report. 

Final Update: I’ve just completed a further report on the successful rescue, and some of its implications.

Russian sub still trapped – rescue underway is a post from: Siberian Light

This NYT article, however, shows that, on a practical level, ties between Russia and Japan are far closer than we might think – perhaps closer even that Russia’s relationship with China on many levels:

Since 2001, there have been annual Japanese port calls to Vladivostok, home to Russia’s Pacific Fleet; there have been no port calls by the Chinese Navy.

Relations between admirals have "developed well on a personal level," a Japanese diplomat in Vladivostok said. Russian Navy cooperation is so close that the Pacific Fleet is discussing a joint commemoration with Japan of the May 27-28, 1905, Battle of Tsushima, in which Russia’s fleet was all but destroyed in the Korea Strait and which secured Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese war.

Today, cooperation between the coast guards is equally close as both countries work to improve safety and reduce pollution and poaching in the Sea of Japan. Through October, a joint Russia-Japan effort to combat poaching netted the detention of 36 ships, compared with three during all of 2003, said Aleksandr Ivankov, deputy head of Russia’s border guards in the Vladivostok region.

Frankly, I think that Russia’s closeness to China is overhyped by scaremongers in the West who are looking for new bad guys, and by those in both Russia and China who want to talk up the importance of their respective nations on the world stage.  Sure, the two countries do have interests in common, but they will never be anything more than allies of convenience because each sees the other as a strategic competitor and a potential military threat. 

Japan, on the other hand, is neither a strategic nor a military competitor for Russia (although they fought a few interesting pre ww2 battles), which can only help the development of a close working relationship between the two.  Japan also shares Russia’s concern about the growing strength of China.  The issue of the Kuriles is, of course, an important one and neither Russia nor Japan will want to be seen to back down over them, but, when push comes to shove, they will not stand in the way of practical co-operation between the two

(Hat tip: American Future)

Practical Russo-Japanese co-operation is a post from: Siberian Light