This September, the heads of each of the EU’s 27 member states met in Brussels for what was only the Union’s 2nd ever emergency summit.  Russia had just crushed its neighbour Georgia in a short, sharp war, and only one item was on the agenda – how should the EU respond to a resurgent Russia on its Eastern borders?

After a full day’s discussions, the 27 wise leaders of the European Union managed to reach the not very startling conclusion that “relations between the EU and Russia have reached a crossroads.”  After screwing up all their courage, they went on to warn Moscow that EU-Russia relations would be subjected to “a careful in-depth examination” at the next scheduled EU-Russia summit.

Not exactly the kind of words that would cause the Kremlin, buoyed by an overwhelming military victory to quake in its boots.

Certainly, the Russian media didn’t think much of Europe’s strong words. “Europe Can Keep Sucking Our Oil and Gas,” was the delightfully crude headline emblazoned across Russian tabloid Tvoi Den.

If French President Nicholas Sarkozy had stood outside of the Kremlin just after the summit and put his ear to the door, he would have heard the sound of two vodka glasses being clinked together, and the harsh laughter of Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, the two men who run Russia.

The lumbering elephant…

By almost every objective measure – population, GDP, military spending to name but a few – Russia is inferior to the European Union.  So why does it seem that Russia is running rings around a beleaguered EU?

Put simply, it’s because the EU draws its strength from unity and Russia is one of the most divisive issues facing the Union today.

The EU is made up of Trojan Horses, Strategic Partners, Friendly Pragmatists, Frosty Pragmatists and New Cold Warriors.

In their excellent November 2007 analysis “A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations” authors Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu argued that, when it comes to Russia, the 27 EU member states can be divided into five distinct groups – Trojan Horses, Strategic Partners, Friendly Pragmatists, Frosty Pragmatists and New Cold Warriors.

The list of Strategic Partners (those countries that Leonard and Popescu describe as enjoying a ‘special relationship with Russia’) is relatively small, but contains three of the powerhouses of EU politics – France, Germany and Italy.  Towards the other end of the scale, the group of Frosty Pragmatists (those countries ‘less afraid than others to speak out against Russian behaviour’) is larger, but contains a just one major power – the United Kingdom.  This, combined with the presence of Poland in the ‘overtly hostile’ New Cold Warriors camp, is enough to ensure that the scales of European Union opinion on Russia are frustratingly balanced.

Each EU member state has its own reasons for being either friendly or hostile towards Russia.  Sometimes these reasons are to do with historical emnity (Poland is a particular case in point here).  Other times, it’s because of business interests.  Greece and Cyrpus, for example, are widely seen to be strong allies of Russia within the EU, and have on occasion threatened to use their veto to defend Russian interests.  And, of course, the prospect of becoming overly dependent on Russian energy supplies is making everyone nervous these days.

…  versus the nimble bear

Russia has raised the game of divide and conquer to an art-form..

Russia isn’t the only country that takes advantage of the European Union’s divisions.  The United States regularly takes advantage of its relationships with the UK, Holland and Poland, to name but a few countries.  In fact, every country’s diplomatic service probably spends a great deal of time thinking about how it can use the tactics of ‘divide and conquer’ effectively against the European Union.

But Russia has taken advantage of European complacency about its weakness, and raised the game of divide and conquer to an art-form.

Russia has assiduously courted smaller EU member states, such as Greece to which it provides substantial military support and Cyprus which receives unstinting political support in its dispute with North Cyprus).    At the same time, it has not been averse to threatening other weak EU states and, over the past 5 years, Russia has cut off oil supplies to Estonia, Latvia and Luthuania – each time, co-incidentally, in the midst of a poltical or economic dispute.

But Russia’s real strength has been in building relationships with its ‘Strategic Partners’.  In particular, it has played on France’s desire to see a multi-polar world, and expended considerable energy on increasing trade with Germany and in wooing key German politicians.

Through an early recognition of Europe’s weaknesses, and an astute manipulation of Europe’s member states Russia has been able to outwit its larger neigbour(s) to the West.

But there is still danger for Russia.  No matter how nimble it is, and how sharp it claws, the EU remains an elephant.  The European elephant is slowly waking up to the danger that Russia poses and, if the EU’s 27 member states ever manage to reach a common position, Russia could find itself squashed underneath the feet of an angry Elephant…

The EU's Lumbering Elephant versus the Nimble Russian Bear is a post from: Siberian Light

The 25th anniversary issue looks ahead to the next 25 years and, in Russia’s Rotting Empire, Nina L Khrushcheva (yes – before you ask – she’s Nikita Kruschev’s great-granddaughter) has penned a look at Russia’s next quarter century.

It’s an interesting article overall, but there were two things I found particularly interesting.

First – Khrushcheva’s view that political change in Russia is cyclical:

“…periods of ‘remission’ (a retreat from total dictatorship) or reforms, and periods of ‘oppression’ or stability have alternated consistently in the last century…”

I do agree, but wonder – if we accept that Russia is in the early stages of a period of “oppression”, how deep will it go, and how long will it be before the next about turn that leads towards reform. Are we in for many more years of sliding towards authoritarianism and a strong Russian state, or will the more frantic pace of globalisation speed up the Russian political cycle?

The second point, which I found intriguing given the disdain with which many Russians view Ukraine (and the fact that Khrushchev was a Ukrainian), was Khrushcheva’s argument that Ukraine could hold the key to Russia’s future.

“Russians know that Ukrainians are the same as them, a people similar in their culture and mentality. If they have made their choice, why can’t we do the same? Thus, if Ukraine succeeds over the next 25 years, it may herald the political death of Putinism.

[...]The best way to help Russia today is to help Ukraine over the coming decades support its claim that it belongs within the European fold, among European institutions.”

Ukraine is at a bit of a cross roads at the moment, and seems like it could go either way. It is clearly an ideal target for both European / US and Russian foreign policy, and I’d imagine it’s going to be a hell of a cultural and political battleground in the coming years. But I have no idea what direction Ukraine will take.

What do you think? Who will come out on top in Ukraine? Will the next couple of years in Kiev set the tone for the next couple of decades in Moscow?

Does Ukraine hold the key to Russia's future? is a post from: Siberian Light

That Russia plans to deploy missiles close to the EU’s border to neutralise the US missile shield. Oh, and that Russia blames America for the war in Georgia.

I know plans for constitutional reform aren’t as sexy as phallic lumps of metal, but I’m baffled at how the world’s media can so spectacularly miss the importance of this. Especially on today, the day that US Presidential politics is reinvigorated by Obama’s election. Sureyly it doesn’t take much imagination for a journalist to draw some parallels between a US democracy that’s on the up, and a Russian democracy that’s on the way down.

How Medvedev’s plan to extend the Russian Presidency from a 4 to a 6 year term could be anything but bad news for Russian democracy is a mystery to me. Seriously – what actual benefits would a six year long Presidency bring over a four year long Presidency? None.

The only reason for doing this is to reduce the need for elections.

Oh, and possibly to ensure that Putin has the option to serve 12 more years as President, if he wants to.

Looking on the bright side though, Medvedev did also announce plans to reduce the threshold for entry into Russia’s parliament from the current 7%. I hope this will go some way towards re-energising Russian politics, but the cynic in me wonders if this is just a devious plan to give small parties like Yabloko an incentive to stay small and squabbling, rather than to see sense and merge.

Medvedev's speech – world misses point is a post from: Siberian Light

“As a result of the excruciating and sluggish exchanges with the editors, the likes of which could only be found in diplomatic history, it was decided to give up trying to place Sergey Lavrov’s article in Foreign Affairs,” said a Foreign Ministry spokesman. 

Apparently, they were arguing over whether to include a sub-heading.  Foreign Affairs wanted to include one that implied that referred to the possibility of a new Cold War.  Lavrov didn’t. 

There’s a good overview of the spat at the New York Times (it’ll probably go behind a firewall soon, so read it quick), although Russophile rightly takes the NYT to task for some biased reporting towards the end of their ‘article’.  Foreign Affairs themselves have published their own take on the story on their website.

Anyway, following the spat, the Russian Foreign Ministry decided to publish Lavrov’s “Containing Russia: Back to the Future” article on their website.

I’ve just read it and, to be honest, it’s a bit dull.  I’d have been disappointed if I paid for Foreign Affairs only to find this bland restatement of Russia’s position on International Politics.

Essentially, it restates Russia’s belief in the Westphalians system of international sovereignty, it’s belief in a system of international rules, that the US pursuit of an ideological crusade for democracy is destabilising, that it’s only natural that a country should take advantage of its competitive advantages (ie. in Russia’s case, energy) in the international marketplace, and that if we all work together we can solve all the world’s problems.

Russian Foreign Minister pulls Foreign Affairs article is a post from: Siberian Light

1. They are failing to diversify away from energy and develop a broad based economy rapidly enough. 
2. They need a rule of law that protects entrepreneurs and helps foster a middle class that will support a democratic market economy. 
3. They have a terrible situation in demography and public health, and have not invested in an adequate social safety net. 
4. Their current bullying attitudes in the energy area are destroying trust and undercutting their soft power in other countries.

I think he’s pretty much nailed it when it comes to identifying what Russia is doing wrong at the moment.  In particular, I like the way he has also identified particular structural strengths and weaknesses that Russia is either failing to take advantage of (energy wealth), or failing to take seriously enough (demography / health).

Having said that, though, I’m not sure that – even if the Russian government fails to find solutions to the problems that Nye identifies – Russia won’t still be a major power in 2020 (in the sense that it will have roughly the same impact on global and regional affairs that it enjoys today). 

2020 is only 13 years away and, unless there are some dramatic global shifts, energy is still going to be an important indicator of power in 2020.  I can’t see Russia losing its edge in that arena. (Nor, to be honest, do I see Russia losing its nuclear power, or its military edge over the majority of its neighbours).  

I can think of a number of (mainly Middle Eastern) oil-rich states that have kept going for years on the back of oil wealth, without addressing the underlying structural problems within their society and economy, and I see no reason why Russia can’t do the same.

The problem that Russia will face, of course, is the same one that every petro-state faces – keeping a population content is relatively easy while the money continues to flow in.  Keeping them happy when the money runs out is another matter altogether.  And, make no mistake – at some stage, the oil money will run out. 

Image courtesy of Waffler.  Thanks to Robert Amsterdam for first bringing Nye’s comments to my attention.  

Joseph Nye – what Russia is doing wrong is a post from: Siberian Light

A couple of scenarios could be in play. The first is that Putin has decided to gain hard cash by putting fissile material on the black market, which is not only insane but counterproductive. After all, Putin has his own insurgencies in the Caucasus, and the material could just as easily find its way there rather that against Putin’s enemies. The second possibility is even more frightening — which is that Russia has lost control over its nuclear materials and wants to keep the West from discovering it.

I think discarding the first option is pretty easy, too.  Putin has no need of hard cash – even if he is approaching retirement, he’s got plenty of far better ways to earn some ‘under the counter’ income.  And Russia as a country isn’t exactly scrabbling around for hard cash, floating as it does on a mighty lake of black gold.

The second option is far, far more plausible and, I think, the most likely option.  Nuclear security in Russia is lax- there simply is no denying it.  Bribery and corruption is endemic, and the people guarding nuclear material are - by and large - poor.  Beyond fear, they have very little incentive to turn down a bundle of thousand rouble notes in return for looking the other way. 

A quick Google search shows that nuclear material has been going missing from Russian stores for a decade or more.  A Guardian news story shows that Chechens might have some radioactive material. 

One final option that should be considered (even though its not one I personally subscribe to) is that the Russian government is deliberately making use of its arsenal of nuclear material to further its political agenda.  This could range from trying to strike fear into the hearts of rogue operatives, to intimidation of friendly (and not so friendly states) by hinting that a dirty bomb is a possibility, to simply trying to persuade Western donors to pay for the cleanup, disposal or security of nuclear material. 

Has Russia lost control of its nuclear weapons? is a post from: Siberian Light

Today’s Washington Times features a story on Russia’s successful test of a maneuverable re-entry warhead. While this may bolster the national pride of Russian scientists and provide opponents of U.S. missile defenses with another talking point, the billions of rubles spent do nothing to address the real threats to Russia’s territorial integrity and security.

I think Charlie is right that the biggest threat to Russia right now is that of instability and militant Islam on it’s Southern borders – although I’m not sure that I’d go so far to suggest that Siberia may become China’s most northerly province. But I do think that he perhaps underestimates the benefits that nuclear weapons bring to Russia, and the relative cheapness of updating the nuclear arsenal compared with addressing deeper, more structural problems such as corruption in the military.

Spending money on addressing the structural problems that beset Russia’s convential military forces (“conventional”, “nuclear” – I feel like I’m back in the Cold War) is, without doubt, going to be of immense benefit to Russia. But restructuring the army is an expensive, and long term project. The problems of addressing corruption in society as a whole are going to be even more challenging. Spending money on nuclear weapons, on the other hand, is, comparatively cheap, and carries large short term benefits (or, to put that more precisely, avoids a great deal of short term damage).

I know it’s a cliche, but nuclear weapons really do carry cachet on the world stage. There is a belief among many states that nuclear power buys influence in global affairs. In the UK, where I live, updating our nuclear arsenal, small though it may be, has become a hot political topic. There are plenty for updating the arsenal, and plenty for turning our nuclear submarines into scrap, but the government seems convinced of the necessity to upgrade. I have no idea of the situation in France, but China is looking to boost it’s nuclear stockpile, and the US isn’t exactly neglecting nuclear research either. (And that’s before we even consider states like Israel, Iran and North Korea). These countries don’t spend all this money on nuclear bombs for fun – they spend it because they respect the nuclear arsenals of their competitors, and want to make sure that their arsenals are respsected also.

I personally don’t buy into their logic, but it is the logic that they use. And they are the people playing the game. It’s what they think that really matters in interstate relations.

One of the main reasons that Russia faces trouble on its borders is the general perception that it is a weak state – a belief shared not just by other states, but by disaffected groups within Russia itself. If Russia’s nuclear arsenal loses the respect of other states around the world, Russia loses respect (in the sense of fear, rather than love, of course) One that respect goes, so does a big chunk of what remains of Russia’s influence and bargaining power in the world. States hostile to Russia will take note of this, and feel emboldened to further provoke instability on and within Russia’s borders.

Although Russia does need to invest in long term projects to ensure its security, it also needs to spend a considerable amount of time, effort and, yes, money, on firefighting. It is hard to push the Cold War to the back of our minds, but perhaps in the early 21st Century, we would do better to look at Russia’s nuclear investments more as a defensive, rather than an agressive stance.

Should Russia waste its money on nuclear weapons is a post from: Siberian Light

In particular, Russian diplomats want to force changes to the Office of Democratic Institutions (ODIHR), which monitors elections.  In particular, says RFE/RL:

Russia dislikes its custom of issuing a comment on elections soon after the polls close. In Russia’s view, ODIHR should submit its reports to the Permanent Council in Vienna and allow it to decide whether they should be published.

The Russian government is unhappy with the OSCE monitors, of course, because they tend to take a critical position on elections held in countries allied with Russia – countries which, to put it charitably, have a tendency to not hold free and fair elections.  Submitting reports to the Council for approval would, they hope, allow Russia to either moderate the content of election monitors’ reports or, at the very least, to delay their publication until well after the election in question, at a time when the news cycle has long since moved on.

Russia is a key member of the OSCE and, as such, has every right to make its demands heard.  The heavy handed way it has done so, however, has not won it any friends, and shows clearly how out of step Russia is with most other members states.*  The OSCE should, and I think will, reject these proposals.  If they reject them out of hand, so much the better.   

Nathan at registan.net has a couple of posts on the topic, including this typically forthright opinion:

At the very least, one would hope that the OSCE would grow a spine and tell Russia to quit acting like a spoiled crybaby.

*Although I’m critical of Russia’s heavy handed methods here, I am finding it hard to resist the temptations to draw parallels here with the way the United States has at times used the threat of witholding part of it’s UN dues in an attempt to prompt reform within that organisation.

Russia demands OSCE reforms is a post from: Siberian Light

[T]he scenario for these exercises – aid to a state suffering political violence – isn’t aimed against any specific country.

However, the way in which Russia and China envisage providing this assistance is seen by many as somewhat provocative, to say the least:

Marines will storm beaches, to be joined by paratroopers in a mock invasion of an imaginary country.

So, is it provocative?  Well, let’s take a charitable look at the operation first.

Several humanitarian assistance operations have required robust military action in recent years, including on occasion actually landing marines on a beach (remember the fanfare as US marines stormed ashore in Somalia in the 1990s?) or potentially invading a country (a huge amount of planning was put in place for a potential invasion of Yugoslavia to protect Kosovo, for example). 

And Russia and China both have on their doorsteps a number of basket-case countries that could potentially require a robust intervention.  The most obvious candidate is North Korea which, if it collapses dramatically, may require a speedy response to secure a number of key military and nuclear sites – not to mention the rapid response that would be required to prevent a humanitarian disaster if refugees attempt to flee across the Chinese and Russian borders.  It’s fair to say that, if Russia and/or China needed to launch a military mission into North Korea, it would likely involve operations by both marines and paratroopers.

Central Asia is also a cause for concern to both Russia and China.  A civil war in Tajikistan in the early 1990s killed more than 50,000 and Russian peacekeepers intervened in response, setting a precedent for Russian-led peacekeeping missions in the region.  Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan all look relatively unstable at the moment, and given the perceived strength of Islamic extremism in the area, an interventionist response is likely to be strongly considered in the event of any conflict.  It’s unlikely that Russian or Chinese troops would be welcomed with open arms by all sections of the population (exactly as the US/NATO operation wasn’t warmly welcomed by all in Afghanistan), and any operation there would need to be prepared for a fight.

So, on the surface at least, there is a clear humanitarian justification for the wargames, and we shouldn’t discount it entirely.  It is certainly at least a part of the motivation of both China and Russia.

But the wargames begin to take on an entirely different, more threatening meaning when you consider that just across the sea from China is Taiwan, when you consider the menacing noises that the Chinese government and military have been making recently, and when you consider that an invasion is thought to be the most likely way that China could repossess its errant territory.

China holds similar exercises on its own fairly regularly, so an exercise of this type isn’t that much out of the ordinary for the Chinese military.  It becomes a different matter, though, because Russia is involved.  The Chinese military in particular will be hoping to get a number of tactical ideas from their Russian counterparts that they can use to enhance their chances of successfully invading Taiwan.  They’ll also be keeping a close eye on Russia’s military hardware, to see how it performs in comparison to their own.  They’ll be noting any deficiences and then deciding whether to further develop their own hardware, or to buy off the shelf from Russia.   

For Russia, the military benefits are relatively small.  They will, of course, gain from co-operation with Chinese troops, and will surely pick up a few tactical ideas.  But, let’s face it, Russia doesn’t have any particular plans to send its marines storming up a beach in the near future.  For Russia, the key practical objective here will be to promote its military hardware, with a view to increasing sales to one of its biggest customers.  Chinese observers are very unlikely to see a horde of Russian conscripts running around – instead they’ll see some of Russia’s best trained servicemen operating some of their latest high-tech weaponry. 

Geopolitical considerations are also important to this exercise, although less important than the practical Russian and Chinese aims that I’ve outlined above.  The two countries have an increasingly close, although still edgy relationship.  Any kind of operation like this allows them to develop a closer working relationship and, more importantly, gives an outward show of co-operation to the rest of the world.  This show is particularly directed at the United States.  From China’s perspective, they will want to give the impression that, should they invade Taiwan, they have at least one major ally.  Additionally, both countries will want to demonstrate that they are able to provide at least some kind of counterbalance to American dominance in the world, and that together they provide at least one of the poles of a multi-polar world.

So, what do we have?  A complex military exercise with multi-layered objectives, and a large number of justifications.  China will benefit more from the exercise than Russia and is, I think, rapidly becoming the senior partner in this relationship – although just how long Russia will be content to remain a junior partner is less sure.  There are plenty of internal tensions which will probably pull their relationship apart over time but, right now, we have a hybrid dragon-bear forcefully telling the world at large that it is a major player.

Russian – Chinese Wargames is a post from: Siberian Light

With the Kremlin’s increasing stranglehold on the flow of information out of Russia, it’s becoming evident that English-language versions of Russian press reports and commentaries, especially if they come from sources outside government control, are being subjected to cutting and censorship of various kinds. An example is Yulia Latynina’s recent column on the Kremlin’s "information block", which appeared in several publications,including Moscow Times.

This is most likely to be self-censorship by news organisations, rather than the heavy hand of an official censor but nonetheless, if true, this would be an extremely worrying development. 

Having said that though, while I can see good reasons why the Kremlin might want to control the flow of information out of Russia, I can’t understand why they would let the same information be published in the Russian language media.  Every English language media organisation, and every major company investing in Russia worth their salt will employ people to sift through the Russian language press as well as English language translations, so censorship of this kind is unlikely to actually stem the flow of information in any practical sense.

Censorship of English language Russian media? is a post from: Siberian Light