Byzantium gave Russia its religion, alphabet, and political culture. Europe gave it modernization, industrialism, and Marxism. And the Mongols gave it a postal system and some words. The Mongol empire was culturally negligible, albeit once militarily powerful, and as such had very little staying power in the long-term in any of the territories it conquered.

The reason Russia focuses on the West is that the bulk of its population lies much closer to Europe. The only part of the country that is truly in Asia is the Russian Far East, which only has about 6mn people, and this lack of scale severely stunts Russia’s economic possibilities in the region. While there is an intense debate in Russian society about whether they are “Europeans-Westerners” or “Russians-Eurasians”, almost no-one seriously considers it to be an Asian civilization; not surprisingly, because apart from the marginal influence of the Mongols, all of Russia’s cultural imports have come from the Greco-Romano-Germanic cultural space.

In contrast, Japan is in Asia; all its core traditions, including religion, have come from Asia (mainly China); and prior to defeat in WW2, it even portrayed itself as a champion of Asia against the West. (Yet even so, according to a friend who spent quite a bit of time in Japan, its people still frequently compare themselves to the West, and even retain a certain inferiority complex towards it, like Russians; the Japanese certainly don’t have any similar complexes in relation to Asia).

Hence the reason why Russia’s leaders have traditionally focused much more towards the West: it had better transport links with and cultural connections with East-Central Europe, Germany, Italy, and France; and it was in military competition with the US. Of course, the growing prominence of Asia means that things are slowly changing, and Russia is looking to take a greater interest in the region (see the rising political fortunes of Japanologist Sergey Naryshkin, the APEC 2012 Summit to be held in Vladivostok, etc), though core geographic realities means that Europe and the Middle East will continue to be higher up on the list of priorities.

Why don’t you learn, say, Kazak, Mongolian, or Korean?

There’s little point in learning Kazakh or Mongolian. I would like to learn Mandarin Chinese (or Japanese), but I haven’t yet had any good opportunities. Hopefully they’ll crop up someday.

I’m always wondering why Russia is paying no or little attention to booming Asia. It seems to me that it’s enigmatic for Russians not to exploit the enormous opportunities for future growth in Asia with its vast territory over Eurasia.

Mr. Karlin insists Russia recognize its status as “a unique Eurasian civilization”. IMO, it’s a bit vague idea with little substance. I cannot but say, “Why don’t you say ‘Russia is going toward Asia, looking for the vast opportunities there’?”

Recently, my country, Japan, has all been rushing to Asia, cutting business ties in North America and building numerous bases in China or South-East Asia. But I think Russia’s shadow in Asia is very bleak at least. None at worst.

I know Russia’s love and hate toward the West, and IMO it is proved in this inverview by indicating no words for “Asia” in it. According to his resume, Mr. Karlin has “[c]omplete fluency in English and Russian”, and “[h]igh degree of reading fluency in French, and some knowledge of German and Latin”. Why don’t you learn, say, Kazak, Mongolian, or Korean? They all were (and are even now in some area) spoken in the former Soviet Union. I’m not blaming Mr. Karlin, but it looks like obvious that he is one of the typical Russians who are obsessed with the West, which I’m afraid would confine Russia’s future course.

Sorry for my aggrandized comment. By the way, I learned economics by a Russian professor. He speaks Japanese and is married to a Japanese woman. He is a good teacher, though very demanding.

Which Russian oil players, exactly? The only companies I know of who overproduce at the expense of the well integrity are the state-owned ones.

I was talking about those. They are public, but there are private interests behind them (i.e. the clans that control them) which divert some of the revenues into their own slush funds, and have an interest in overproduction because their oil company can be taken away on short notice should the Tsar turn against them.

It was Soviet style management which demanded the increased production, leading to the water injection which has ruined a lot of Russia’s existing developments. Why on earth would you want to return to that?

As I mentioned, the problem is that the criteria the Soviets was wrong, i.e. focused on increasing production never mind the costs in inefficiency / waste. I am not disagreeing with your point that modernization is not equivalent to output maximization, in fact I am very much for output reduction *and* greater efficiency!

The reason I am in favor of output reduction is that I believe in peak oil and consequently that oil will become much more strategically important even than it already is. I also happen to believe that Russia passed its second peak in 2008-09 and that it will not decline at an accelerating pace whatever policy the government pursues. Finally, I think that Russia might as well control the pace of the decline itself rather than letting geology dictate it, such that its oil resources last longer relative to the world, than they would otherwise.

Since you do share these beliefs, your conclusions are of course going to be different.

Firstly, international capital does not have interests. The holders of international capital do, but they are hardly the drivers of oil and gas projects. Oil and gas projects generally go looking for capital, not the other way around.

Secondly, if Russia does not develop new oilfields then its industry will stagnate further to the point that they will not be able to maintain adequate production levels. Unless and until Russia finds an alternative revenue stream to its sale of oil and gas, any severe drop in production will cause them enormous financial problems. I agree that Russia needs to wean itself off oil and gas in terms of its percentage of state revenue, but a strong oil and gas sector should always make up a part of the Russian portfolio.

I think you are making the mistake of thinking development must equal a drive to maximise production, I see it more as a modernisation process whilst only maintaining approximate production rates. The Russian oil and gas sector is as backward as hell. The infrastructure is almost non-existent and the technology and processes antiquated. They have a grand total of one LNG plant in the whole country. Russia’s existing oilfields are beyond the point of being upgraded, any modernisation of Russia’s oil and gas industry must take place in new fields. If they don’t develop them, they will have to suffer the consequences of having 1970s technology in their facilities. Their car industry has already recognised this is a problem.

The “public-private” nature of most of today’s Russian oil players encourages corruption and even over-production (and associated well damage), and certainly does not constitute a far-sighted plan to conserve resources.

Which Russian oil players, exactly? The only companies I know of who overproduce at the expense of the well integrity are the state-owned ones.

If I came to power, I would either enhance property rights while increasing the tax rate on oil exports from already developed deposits, or return to Soviet-style physical management with stringent controls on corruption and revised performance criteria that does not involve raising production.

It was Soviet style management which demanded the increased production, leading to the water injection which has ruined a lot of Russia’s existing developments. Why on earth would you want to return to that?

That said, I don’t favor the present structure either. The “public-private” nature of most of today’s Russian oil players encourages corruption and even over-production (and associated well damage), and certainly does not constitute a far-sighted plan to conserve resources.

If I came to power, I would either enhance property rights while increasing the tax rate on oil exports from already developed deposits, or return to Soviet-style physical management with stringent controls on corruption and revised performance criteria that does not involve raising production.